In this paper, we present two non-zero inner-product encryption (NIPE) schemes that are adaptively secure under a standard assumption, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption, in the standard model. One of the proposed NIPE schemes features constant-size ciphertexts and the other features constant-size secret-keys. Our NIPE schemes imply an identity-based revocation (IBR) system with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys that is adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption. Any previous IBR scheme with constantsize ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys was not adaptively secure in the standard model. This paper also presents two zero inner-product encryption (ZIPE) schemes each of which has constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys and is adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption in the standard model. They imply an identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) system with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys that is adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption. We also extend the proposed ZIPE schemes into two directions, one is a fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys, and the other a hierarchical ZIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts.
Introduction

Background
Functional encryption (FE) is an advanced concept of encryption or a generalization of publickey encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE). In FE systems, a receiver can decrypt a ciphertext using a secret-key corresponding to a parameter v if v is suitably related to another parameter x specified for the ciphertext, or R(v, x) = 1 for some relation R (i.e., relation R holds for (v, x) ) .
The first flavor of functional encryption traces back to the work of Sahai and Waters [20] , which was subsequently extended in [4, 10, 13, 18] . In their concept called attribute-based encryption (ABE), for example, parameter v for a secret-key is an access control policy, and parameter x for a ciphertext is a set of attributes. Decryption requires attribute set x to satisfy policy v, i.e., relation R ABE (v, x) = 1 iff x satisfies v. Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) [1, 5, 6, 9, 21] and revocation (IBR) [14] schemes can also be thought of as functional encryption systems where a ciphertext is encrypted for a set of identities S = {ID 1 , . . . , ID n } in IBBE (resp. IBR) systems, and to decrypt it by a secret-key associated with ID requires that ID ∈ S (resp. ID ∈ S), i.e., relation R IBBE (ID, S) = 1 (resp. R IBR (ID, S) = 1) iff ID ∈ S (resp. ID ∈ S).
Katz, Sahai and Waters [12] introduced a functional encryption scheme for zero inner products, zero inner product encryption (ZIPE) where a ciphertext encrypted with vector x can be decrypted by any key associated with vector v such that v · x = 0, i.e., relation R ZIPE ( v, x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. Their scheme is selectively secure in the standard model and the ciphertext size is linear in the dimension of vectors, n, although it achieves an additional security property, attribute-hiding, in which x is hidden from the ciphertext. As shown in [12] , ZIPE provides functional encryption for a wide class of relations corresponding to equalities, polynomials and CNF/DNF formulae.
Attrapadung and Libert [2] proposed a ZIPE scheme as well as a non-zero IPE (NIPE) scheme, where NIPE relation R NIPE ( v, x) = 1 iff v · x = 0. NIPE supports a wide class of relations corresponding to the complement of those for ZIPE. In their ZIPE and NIPE schemes, without retaining the attribute-hiding property, the ciphertext size reduces to a constant in n (the dimension of vectors, v and x), as long as the description of the vector is not considered a part of the ciphertext, which is a common assumption in the broadcast encryption/revocation applications. Hereafter in this paper, "constant" will be used in this sense. In addition, the number of pairing operations for decryption in [2] is constant. Their ZIPE system is adaptively secure in the standard model, but the NIPE scheme is not adaptively secure (co-selectively secure) in the standard model. The ZIPE system [2] implies an adaptively secure identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme with constant-size ciphertexts in the standard model, while previous IBBE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts were either only selective-ID secure [1, 5, 6] or secure in a non-standard model [9, 21] . Among IBBE systems with short ciphertexts (including selective-ID secure ones), the IBBE scheme [2] is the only one relying on standard assumptions, DBDH and DLIN assumptions. The NIPE scheme [2] implies a co-selectively secure (not adaptively secure) identity-based revocation (IBR) system [14] with constant-size ciphertexts in the standard model. Lewko, Sahai and Waters [14] presented IBR systems with constant-size public and secret keys that are not adaptively secure. Hence, the following problems are still remained.
1. No NIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts is adaptively secure in the standard model, and no IBR scheme with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys is adaptively secure in the standard model. No NIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys has been presented.
2.
No ZIPE (or no IBBE) scheme with constant-size ciphertexts is adaptively (or selectively) secure under a single standard assumption in the standard model. No ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys has been presented.
Our Result
1. This paper presents the first NIPE scheme that has constant-size ciphertexts or constantsize secret-keys and that is adaptively secure in the standard model (Sections 6 and 7). The security assumption is a standard one, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. This implies the first IBR scheme with constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys that is adaptively secure in the standard model.
2. This paper also presents the first ZIPE scheme that has constant-size ciphertexts or constant-size secret-keys and is adaptively secure solely under a single standard assumption, the DLIN assumption, in the standard model (Sections 8 and 9). This implies the first IBBE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts that is adaptively secure solely under a single standard assumption in the standard model.
3. We present two extensions of the proposed ZIPE schemes. One is a fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys (Section 10). It is obtained by applying the technique of the fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme in [19] to the proposed ZIPE scheme with constant-size secret-keys in Section 9, while the ZIPE scheme in Section 9 is weaklyattribute-hiding. The other extension is a hierarchical ZIPE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts (Section 12). These schemes are adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption in the standard model.
The number of pairing operations for decryption is constant in all the proposed schemes. We summarize a comparison of our results with those of [2] in Table 1 in Section 11 (see the items of 'Security', 'Assump.', 'CT Size' and 'SK Size' in Table 1 , for the features discussed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2).
Related Works
Several ABE schemes [3, 7, 11] with constant-size ciphertexts have been proposed. Among them, [7, 11] only support limited classes of predicates that do not cover the classes supported by ZIPE or NIPE, while [3] supports a wider class of relations, non-monotone predicates, than those by ZIPE or NIPE. All of these ABE schemes, however, are only selectively secure in the standard model. Adaptively secure and attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme under the DLIN assumption has been presented [18] , but the ciphertext-size is linear in n (not constant), while our ZIPE scheme has constant-size ciphertexts and is adaptively secure but not attribute-hiding.
Key Techniques
All of the proposed schemes in this paper are constructed on dual system encryption [22, 15] and dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [17, 13, 18] . See Section 1.5 for some notations in this section. In DPVS, a pair of dual (or orthonormal) bases, B and B * , are randomly generated using a fully random linear transformation X U ← GL(N, F q ) (N : dimension of span B and span B * ) such that B and B * are transformed from canonical basis A by X and (X −1 ) T , respectively (see Section 2 and [17, 13, 18] ). In a typical application of DPVS to cryptography, a part of B (say B ) is used as a public key and the corresponding part of B * (sayB * ) is used as a secret key or trapdoor.
In this paper, we develop a novel technique on DPVS, where we employ a special form of random linear transformation X ∈ GL(N, F q ), or X ∈ L(4, n, F q ) of Eq. (3) in Section 6.2, in place of fully random linear transformation X U ← GL(N, F q ). This form of X provides us a framework to achieve short ciphertexts or short secret-keys as well as a small number of pairing operations in decryption. It, however, is a challenging task to find such a special form of X like Eq. (3) that meet the several requirements for the dual system encryption method to prove the adaptive security of ZIPE and NIPE schemes under the DLIN assumption. Such requirements are given hereafter. To reduce the security of our schemes, especially Problems 1 and 2 in this paper, to the DLIN assumption, the form of X should be consistent with the distribution of the DLIN problem. The form of X should be sparse enough to achieve short ciphertexts or secret-keys. We should also have a special pairwise independence lemma, Lemma 6 in Section 6.4, that is due to the special form of X, where linear random transformations U and Z are more restricted (or specific) than those of previous results, e.g., [18] , with fully random X. See Section 6.1 for more details.
Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y R ← A denotes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U ← A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q , e.g., x denotes (
The vector 0 is abused as the zero vector in F n q for any n. X T denotes the transpose of matrix X. I denotes the × identity matrix. A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g.,
denotes the subspace generated by b 1 , . . . , b (resp. x 1 , . . . , x ). For bases B := (b 1 , . . . , b N ) and
n of vectors, e j denotes the canonical basis vector (
. . , n. GL(n, F q ) denotes the general linear group of degree n over F q . For a linear subspace V ⊂ F n q , V ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement, i.e., 
This is nondegenerate bilinear i.e., e(sx, ty) = e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ V, then x = 0. For all i and j, e(a i , a j ) = e(G, G) δ i,j where δ i,j = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and
which can be easily achieved by φ i,j (x) := (
DPVS generation algorithm G dpvs takes input 1 λ (λ ∈ N) and N ∈ N, and outputs a description of param V := (q, V, G T , A, e) with security parameter λ and N -dimensional V. It can be constructed by using G bpg .
For the asymmetric version of DPVS, (q, V, V * , G T , A, A * , e), see Appendix A.2 in [18] .
Definitions of Zero and Non-zero Inner-Product Encryption (ZIPE / NIPE)
This section defines zero and non-zero inner-product encryption (ZIPE / NIPE) and their security. The relations R ZIPE of ZIPE and R NIPE of NIPE are defined over vectors x ∈ F n q \ { 0} and v ∈ F n q \ { 0}, where Informally, in adaptively fully-attribute-hiding security game, adversary is allowed to issue both types of key queries, R( v, x (b) ) = 0 and R( v, x (b) ) = 1, in a single security game. It gives a strong security than Definition 5 and is given in the following Definition 6.
Definition 6 (Adaptively Fully-Attribute-Hiding Security) The model for proving the adaptively fully-attribute-hiding security of ZIPE under chosen plaintext attacks is obtained from the above game by replacing Challenge and Phase 2 steps by the following:
Challenge The adversary submits challenge attribute vector ( x (0) , x (1) ) and challenge plaintexts (m (0) , m (1) ), subject to the following restrictions:
• v · x (0) = 0 and v · x (1) = 0 for all the key queried predicate vectors, v.
• Two challenge plaintexts are equal, i.e., m (0) = m (1) , and any key query v satisfies R( v, x (0) ) = R( v, x (1) ), i.e., one of the following conditions. (1) , and s := 1 otherwise.
Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption
Definition 7
The DLIN problem is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given
For a probabilistic machine E, we define the advantage of E for the DLIN problem as:
For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary E, the advantage Adv
Special Matrix Subgroups
Lemmas 1-3 are key lemmas for the security proof for our (H)IPE schemes. For positive integers w and n, let
Lemma 1 is directly verified from the definition of groups.
Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 are given in Appendix A.1.
NIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Ciphertexts
Key Ideas in Constructing the Proposed NIPE Scheme
In this section, we will explain key ideas of constructing and proving the security of the proposed NIPE scheme. First, we will show how short ciphertexts and efficient decryption can be achieved in our scheme. Here, we will use a simplified (or toy) version of the proposed NIPE scheme, for which the security is no more ensured in the standard model under the DLIN assumption.
A ciphertext in the simplified NIPE scheme consists of two vector elements, (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ G 5 × G n , and c 3 ∈ G T . A secret-key consists of two vector elements, (k * 0 , k * 1 ) ∈ G 5 × G n . Therefore, to achieve constant-size ciphertexts, we have to compress c 1 ∈ G n to a constant size in n. We now employ a special form of basis generation matrix, X :=
of Eq. (1) The system parameter or DPVS public basis is B :=
Let a ciphertext associated with x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be c 1 :
. That is, a ciphertext (excluding x) can be just two group elements, or the size is constant in n.
Let B * := (b * i ) be the dual orthonormal basis of B := (b i ), and B * be the master secret key in the simplified NIPE scheme. We specify (c 0 , 
That is, n−1 scalar multiplications in G and two pairing operations are enough for computing e(c 1 , k * 1 ). Therefore, only a small (constant) number of pairing operations are required for decryption.
We then explain how our full NIPE scheme is constructed on the above-mentioned simplified NIPE scheme. The target of designing the full NIPE scheme is to achieve the adaptive security under the DLIN assumption. Here, we adopt a strategy similar to that of [18] , in which the dual system encryption methodology is employed in a modular or hierarchical manner. That is, two top level assumptions, the security of Problems 1 and 2, are directly used in the dual system encryption methodology and these assumptions are reduced to a primitive assumption, the DLIN assumption.
To meet the requirements for applying to the dual system encryption methodology and reducing to the DLIN assumption, the underlying vector space as well as the basis generator matrix X is four times greater than that of the above-mentioned simplified scheme. For example,
of Eq. (3) in Section 6.2, where each X i,j is of the form of X ∈ H(n, F q ) in the simplified scheme. The vector space consists of four orthogonal subspaces, i.e., real encoding part, hidden part, secret-key randomness part, and ciphertext randomness part. The simplified NIPE scheme corresponds to the first real encoding part. A key fact in the security reduction is that L(4, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(4n, F q ) (Lemma 2), which enables a random-self-reducibility argument for reducing the DLIN problem to Problems 1 and 2 in this paper. The property that H(n, F q ) ∩ GL(n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(n, F q ) is also crucial for a special form of pairwise independence lemma in this paper (Lemma 6), where H(n, F q ) is specified in L(4, n, F q ) or X. Our Problem 2, which is based on this lemma, employs special form matrices U U ← H(n, F q ) ∩ GL(n, F q ) and Z := (U −1 ) T . Informally, our pairwise independence lemma implies that, for all ( x, v), a pair, ( xU, vZ), are uniformly distributed over (span x, e n \ span e n ) × (F n q \ span e n ⊥ ) with preserving the inner-product value, x · v, i.e., ( xU, vZ) reveal no information but x and x · v.
A difference of matrix X with the ZIPE scheme will be noted in Remark 9.
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G
NIPE,CT ob
below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed NIPE scheme.
. . .
where a blank element in the matrix denotes 0 ∈ G. B 1 is the dual orthonormal basis of
Construction
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector,
..,4;l=1,...,n , can be identified
) through the form of Eq. (6), while
.,4; l=1,..,n by Eq. (6). Decryption Dec can be alterna-tively described as:
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryption Dec , F = e(c 0 ,
Security
The proofs of Lemmas 4-12 are given in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1 The proposed NIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 , E 2-1 and E 2-2 whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
, ν is the maximum number of A's key queries and := (11ν + 6)/q.
Lemmas for the Proof of Theorem 1
We will show Lemmas 4-6 for the proof of Theorem 1.
Definition 8 (Problem 1) Problem 1 is to guess β, given
where (6)). If we make e β,1,l ∈ V 1 for β = 0, 1; l = 1, . . . , n as:
. For a probabilistic machine B, we define the advantage of B as the quantity
they are expressed over B 1 as:
Using these vector expressions, the output of
Lemma 4 For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running times are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
P1 B (λ) ≤ Adv DLIN E (λ) + 5/q.
Definition 9 (Problem 2) Problem 2 is to guess β, given
where 
Remark 4 A part of output of
Lemma 5 For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter
λ, Adv P2 B (λ) ≤ Adv DLIN E (λ) + 5/q. Lemma 6 Let e n := (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ F n q . For all x ∈ F n q \ span e n and π ∈ F q , let W x,π := {( r, w) ∈ (span x, e n \ span e n ) × (F n q \ span e n ⊥ ) | r · w = π}. For all ( x, v) ∈ F n q \ span e n × F n q \ span e n ⊥ , for all ( r, w) ∈ W x,( x· v) , Pr [ xU = r ∧ vZ = w ] = 1 W x,( x· v) , where U U ← H(n, F q ) ∩ GL(n, F q ) and Z := (U −1 ) T .
Proof Outline
At the top level of strategy of the security proof, we follow the dual system encryption methodology proposed by Waters [22] . In the methodology, ciphertexts and secret keys have two forms, normal and semi-functional. In the proof herein, we also introduce other forms of secret keys called 1st-pre-semi-functional and 2nd-pre-semi-functional. The real system uses only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional/1st-pre-semi-functional/2nd-pre-semi-functional keys are used only in a sequence of security games for the security proof. To prove this theorem, we employ Game 0 (original adaptive-security game) through Game 3. In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to semi-functional. When at most ν secret key queries are issued by an adversary, there are 3ν game changes from Game 1 (Game 2-0-3), Game 2-1-1, Game 2-1-2, Game 2-1-3 through Game 2-ν-3. In Game 2-h-1, the first (h − 1) keys are semi-functional and the h-th key is 1st-pre-semifunctional, while the remaining keys are normal, and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. In Game 2-h-2, the first (h − 1) keys are semi-functional and the h-th key is 2nd-pre-semifunctional, while the remaining keys are normal, and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. In Game 2-h-3, the first h keys are semi-functional (i.e., and the h-th key is semi-functional), while the remaining keys are normal, and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
The final game (Game 3) with advantage 0 is conceptually changed from Game 2-ν-3. As usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible.
When at most ν key queries are issued by an adversary, we set a sequence of sk := sk v 's, i.e., (sk (1) * , . . . , sk (ν) * ), in the order of the adversary's queries. Here we focus on k
), and c x := (c 0 , {C 1,j , C 2,j } j=1,...,4 , c 3 ), and ignore the other part of sk v (resp. ct x ), i.e., v (resp. i.e., x), and call them secret key and ciphertext, respectively, in this proof outline. In addition, we ignore a negligible factor in the (informal) descriptions of this proof outline. For example, we say "A is bounded by B" when A ≤ B + (λ) where (λ) is negligible in security parameter λ.
, is the correct form of the secret key of the proposed NIPE scheme, and is expressed by Eq. (7). Similarly, a normal ciphertext c norm (11)) are distinguishable by the simulator or challenger, but the joint distributions of ( k
) along with the other keys are (information theoretically) equivalent for the adversary's view, when x · v = 0, i.e., R NIPE ( x, v) = 1. Therefore, as shown in Lemma 9, the advantages of Games 2-h-1 and 2-h-2 are equivalent. The advantage gap between Games 2-h-2 and 2-h-3 is similarly shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2 (i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption) (Lemmas 10 and 5). Finally we show that Game 2-ν-3 can be conceptually changed to Game 3 (Lemma 11) by using the fact that basis vectors b 0,2 and b * 0,3 are unknown to the adversary.
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we consider the following (3ν + 3) games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients that were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0 : Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for v is
where δ, ϕ 0
where
q with x l = 0 for some l ∈ {1, .., n − 1}. Game 1 : Same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext for challenge plaintexts (m (0) , m (1) ) and x is
where τ
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0. Game 2-h-1 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-0-3 is Game 1. Game 2-h-1 is the same as Game 2-(h − 1)-3 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v,
where ρ (9) and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1)-3. Game 2-h-2 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-2 is the same as Game 2-h-1 except that a part of the reply to the h-th key query for v,
where w U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1. Game 2-h-3 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-3 is the same as Game 2-h-2 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v,
where all the variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2. Game 3 : Same as Game 2-ν-3 except that c 0 and c 3 of the challenge ciphertext are
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν-3.
Let Adv 
Lemma 8
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2-1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Lemma 9
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Lemma 10
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2-2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Lemma 11
Lemma 12
For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv 
NIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Secret-Keys
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G NIPE,SK ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed NIPE scheme, where G NIPE,CT ob is given in Section 6.2. 
Construction and Security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ), has an index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with v l = 0, and that input vector, x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), satisfies x n = 0. 1,1 , .., b 1,n , b 1,3n+1 , .., b 1,4n ), 
, ν is the maximum number of A's key queries and := (11ν + 6)/q. Theorem 2 is proven similarly to Theorem 1.
ZIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Ciphertexts
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G ZIPE,CT ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed Zero IPE scheme. Since the definition is employed for the scheme with w = 5 in Section 10, we describe G ZIPE,CT ob for general w. (We use only the cases with w = 4, 5).
where {μ i,j , μ i,j,l } are non-zero entries of submatrices X i,j of X as given in Eqs. (5) and (1), 
Construction and Security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), has an index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with x l = 0, and that input vector, v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ), satisfies v n = 0. 
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryption Dec , F = e(c, k) = g
Remark 9
The proposed ZIPE in this section employs a single basis, B, generated by X ∈ GL(4n + 1, F q ) (or X ∈ L + (4, n, F q ) of Eq. (5) Hence, the ciphertext and secret key of the ZIPE scheme are shorter than those of the NIPE scheme (see Table 1 in Section 11). It is due to the difference of the decryption tricks in the ZIPE and NIPE schemes. Similarly to the fact on L(4, n, F q ) (for the security of the NIPE scheme) shown in Section 6.1, it is crucial for the security of the ZIPE scheme that L + (4, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(4n + 1, F q ) (Lemma 3), and its security proof is made in the essentially same manner as explained in Section 6.1.
Theorem 3 The proposed ZIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 and E 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
, ν is the maximum number of A's key queries, and := (11ν + 6)/q.
Proof. To prove Theorem 3, we consider the following (ν + 3) games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients that were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0 : Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for v is A (λ), which requires a detailed proof for our ZIPE with constant-size ciphertexts (see Appendix A.3 for the proof). Combining the gap evaluations, we obtain Theorem 3. 
Lemma 13 For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv
ZIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Secret-Keys
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G ZIPE,SK ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed ZIPE scheme, where G ZIPE,CT ob is defined in Section 7.1. Since the definition is employed for the scheme with w = 5 in Section 10, we describe G ZIPE,SK ob for general w. (We use only the cases with w = 4, 5). 
Construction and Security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ), has an index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with v l = 0, and that input vector, x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), satisfies x n = 0. 
Remark 11 A part of output of
Theorem 4 The proposed ZIPE scheme is adaptively weakly-attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 and E 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
Proof.
To prove Theorem 4, we consider the following (ν + 3) games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients that were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0 : Original game. That is, the reply to a key query for v is 2-h (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-0 is Game 1. Game 2-h is the same as Game 2-(h − 1) except that a part of the reply to the h-th key query for v, k * , is
where w U ← span v, e n and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1). Game 3 : Same as Game 2-ν except that c and c 3 of the challenge ciphertext are
, and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν. 
Fully-Attribute-Hiding ZIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Secret-Keys
By applying our technique to the fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE scheme in [19] , we obtain a fullyattribute-hiding ZIPE scheme with short secret-keys.
Construction and Security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, v := (v 1 , . . . , v n ), has an index l (1 ≤ l ≤ n − 1) with v l = 0, and that input vector, x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), satisfies x n = 0.
Parse c as a (5n + 1)-tuple (C 0 , . . . , C 5n 
[Correctness] Using the alternate decryption Dec , F = e(c, k) = g Proof. Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 in [19] , the proof of Theorem 5 is reduced to that of Lemma 15.
Theorem 5 The proposed ZIPE scheme is adaptively fully-attribute-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines
E 0-1 , E 0-2 , E 1-1 , E 1-2-1 and E 1-2-2 ,
whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
First, we execute a preliminary game transformation from Game 0 (original security game in Definition 6) to Game 0', which is the same as Game 0 except that flip a coin t U ← {0, 1} before setup, and the game is aborted in the challenge step if t = s. We define that A wins with probability 1/2 when the game is aborted (and the advantage in Game 0' is Pr[A wins ] − 1/2 as well). Since t is independent from s, the game is aborted with probability 1/2. Hence, the advantage in Game 0' is a half of that in Game 0, i.e., Adv As for the conditional probability with t = 0, it holds that, for any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 and E 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, in Game 0', Pr[A wins
and ν is the maximum number of A's key queries and := (6ν +5)/q. This is obtained in the same manner as the weakly attribute-hiding security of the OT10 IPE in the full version of [18] : Since the difference between our IPE and the OT10 IPE is only the dimension of the hidden subspaces, i.e., the former has 2n and the latter has n, the weakly attribute-hiding security of the OT10 IPE implies the security with t = 0 of our IPE.
As for the conditional probability with t = 1, i.e., Pr[A wins | t = 1], Lemma 15 holds. Therefore, Adv 
Proof.
To prove Lemma 15, we consider the following 4ν + 3 games when t = 1. In Game 0', a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0' : Same as Game 0 except that flip a coin t U ← {0, 1} before setup, and the game is aborted in the challenge step if t = s. In order to prove Lemma 15, we consider the case with t = 1.
The reply to a key query for v is: (1) ) is:
where ω U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 0'. (1) ) is:
where ω , ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-(h − 1)-4.
Game 2-h-2 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-2 is the same as Game 2-h-1 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v is:
where σ U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-1. 3 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-3 is the same as Game 2-h-2 except that c 1 of the challenge ciphertext for (challenge plaintexts m := m (0) = m (1) and) vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
Game 2-h-
where ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-2.
Game 2-h-4 (h = 1, . . . , ν) : Game 2-h-4 is the same as Game 2-h-3 except that the reply to the h-th key query for v is:
where σ U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-3.
Game 3 : Game 3 is the same as Game 2-ν-4 except that c 1 of the challenge ciphertext for (challenge plaintexts m := m (0) = m (1) and) vectors ( x (0) , x (1) ) is:
where ω 0 , ω 1 U ← F q and all the other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν-4. Here, we note that c 1 is independent from bit b
A (λ), Adv
(λ) and Adv A (λ) = 0. We can evaluate the gaps between pairs of neighboring games, Adv
A (λ), similarly to [19] . This completes the proof of Lemma 15. Table 1 compares the proposed ZIPE and NIPE schemes (ZIPE with short ciphertexts in Section 8, NIPE with short ciphertexts in Section 6, ZIPE with short secret-keys in Section 9, NIPE with short secret-keys in Section 7, and fully-attribute-hiding ZIPE with short secret-keys in Section 10) with the ZIPE and NIPE schemes in [2] that are secure under standard assumptions. 
Comparison
CT size
Hierarchical ZIPE Scheme with Constant-Size Ciphertexts
The proposed hierarchical ZIPE (HIPE) scheme with short ciphertexts is constructed by using two vector spaces, 5-dimensional V 0 and 4n-dimensional V 1 , where hierarchical vector  ( v 1 , . . . , v ) (resp. ( x 1 , . . . , x ) ) of secret-key (resp. ciphertext) is embedded in an element in V 1 . The delegation mechanism is based on the payload hiding HIPE scheme given in Appendix H.3 in the full version of [18] .
Dual Orthonormal Basis Generator
We describe random dual orthonormal basis generator G HIPE,CT ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed hierarchical ZIPE scheme.
..,n denotes non-zero entries of X 1 as in Eq. (4), j , B i,j,l } i,j=1,...,4;l=1,. ..,n , B * 1 ).
Remark 13 Let
. . . = (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,4n ) , where a blank element in the matrix denotes 0 ∈ G. B 1 is the dual orthonormal basis of B * 1 , i.e., e(b 1,i 
Construction and Security
In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector, x t := (x t,1 , . . . , x t,nt ), has an index (t, l) = (1, 1) with x t,l = 0, and that level-1 input vector, Setup(1 λ , n), {B i,j , B i,j,l } i=1,4;j=1,...,4;l=1,. ..,n , can be identified with B 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , b 1,3n+1 , .., b 1,4n ) through the form of Eq. (6), while B 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,4n ) is identified with {B i,j , B i,j,l } i,j=1,..,4; l=1,. .,n by Eq. (6) . Decryption Dec can be alternatively described as:
Remark 14 A part of output of
The definition of adaptively payload-hiding security and the advantage Adv HIPE,PH A (λ) of adversary A can be obtained through a straightforward extension of that of HIBE, e.g., [8] , with replacing ID-matching by vector-orthogonality.
Theorem 6 The proposed HIPE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption.
For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 and E 2 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
, ν is the maximum number of adversary A's key queries, and = (11ν + 6)/q. Theorem 6 is proven similarly to Theorem 3.
Concluding Remarks
The technique with using special type matrices shown in this paper can reduce the size of ciphertexts or secret-keys of adaptively secure FE schemes in [18] 
where d is the number of sub-universes of attributes, and n is the maximal length of attribute vectors. A key-policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) system with constant-size ciphertext [3] is selectively secure in the standard model. Therefore, it is an interesting open problem to realize an adaptively secure and constant-size ciphertext ABE scheme.
A Proofs of Lemmas
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 in Section 5
For a positive integer x, let [x] := {1, . . . , x}.
Lemma 2 L(w, n, F q ) and L(w, n, F q ) are subgroups of GL(wn, F q ).
Proof. Below, we will show that L(w, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(wn, F q ). For L(w, n, F q ) , the lemma is proven in the same manner as for L(w, n, F q ) .
Based on the block partition on X ∈ F wn×wn q with submatrices X i,j ∈ F n×n q , i.e., X := [wn]
. We denote the corresponding permutation matrix by Π, i.e., the left multiplication by Π is equivalent to the permutation π on rows (of X). Π −1 = Π T since Π is a permutation matrix, and we see that the right multiplication by Π −1 is equivalent to the permutation π on columns (of X).
Let the conjugate set P(w, n,
Since the rows and columns are permuted by π, for X :
We see that P(w, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(wn, F q ). So, L(w, n, F q ) = Π −1 · P(w, n, F q ) · Π is also a subgroup of GL(wn, F q ). This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. For the proof, we define an injective group homomorphism,
We will show the following claim.
This equality is on the right-down corner of the following diagram,
. . , w + 1, and
. . , w + 1, where a blank element in the submatrices denotes 0 ∈ F q . That is,
Since L(w + 1, n, F q ) (and ι(GL((w + 1)n, F q ))) are subgroups of GL((w + 1)n, F q ) (Lemma 2), from Claim 1, ι(L + (w, n, F q )) is a subgroup of GL((w + 1)n, F q ). Therefore, since ι is an injective group homomorphism, L + (w, n, F q )) is also a subgroup of GL(wn + 1, F q ). This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
A.2 Proofs of Lemmas 4-12 in Section 6
A.2.1 Preliminaries Figure 1 shows the structure of security reduction for Theorem 1, where the security of the scheme is hierarchically reduced to the intractability of the DLIN problem. Basic Problems 0, 1, 2 are defined below. The reduction steps indicated by arrows will be shown below, and the step given by dotted arrow can be shown in the same manner as that in (the full version of) [18] . For the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, we give the following intermediate problem, Basic Problem 0 (Definition 10) and Lemma 16. (In [18] , an additional element δξG is included in an output of Basic Problem 0 for a shorter dimension 3n + 1 than 4n. Here, it is not necessary.)
Definition 10 (Basic Problem 0) Basic Problem 0 is to guess
Proof. We note that dual bases (B, B * ) in Basic Problem 0 are generated by a general linear matrix X U ← GL(3, F q ), so Lemma 16 is proven in a similar manner to the security proof of Basic Problem 0 in [18] .
The following Remark 15 is for the proofs of Lemmas of 17 and 19. , y) for any x, y ∈ V.
Remark 15 For matrix
W := (χ i,j ) i,j=1,...,N ∈ F N ×N q and element v in N -dimensional V, W (v) denotes N,N i=1,j=1 χ i,j φ i,j (v) using canonical maps {φ i,j } (Definition 2). Similarly, for matrix (ϑ i,j ) := (W −1 ) T , (W −1 ) T (v) := N,N i=1,j=1 ϑ i,j φ i,j (v). It holds that e(W (x), (W −1 ) T (y)) = e(x
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running times are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
Proof.
At the top level, the proof of Lemma 4 is similar to the security proof of Problem 1 in [18] . The main difference is that special form matrices Eq. (3) are used for generating master public and secret keys in our schemes. One key fact for the security reduction is that L(4, n, F q ) is a subgroup of GL(4n, F q ) (Lemma 2).
For the proof of Lemma 4, we give the following intermediate problem, Basic Problems 1 (Definition 11). From Lemmas 16, 17 and 18, we obtain Lemma 4.
Based on Remark 3, hereafter, we consider the output of
..,n ) and also we give the output of Basic Problem 1 as such a vector form over bases {B t } t=0,1 . 
Definition 11 (Basic Problem 1) Basic Problem 1 is to guess
where g T is contained in param BP0 . D generates random linear transformation defined by matrices W 0
, where P(4, n, F q ) is given in Eq. (14) . Then D sets
with σ 0 := σ + η, and g β,1,i (i = 1, . . . , n) are expressed over bases P 1 and D 1 as
where δ, ρ, σ, and σ 0 are distributed uniformly in F q . Therefore, the distribution of (param n ,
..,n ) is exactly the same as
Lemma 18
For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine C, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv
Proof. Given a Basic Problem 1 instance = (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , d 1,n+1 , . . . , d 1,2n , b 1,2n+1 , . . . , b 1,4n ), , n) , where Moreover, we see that the distribution of P 1 is equivalent to that of bases generated by using random special type matrix Y U ← P(4, n, F q ). For the permutation π given in Eq. (13) where ϕ i := σ e i + η i , and δ, ρ, σ, ω, τ ∈ F q , and ϕ i ∈ F n q are uniformly and independently distributed. Therefore, the distribution of (param n , { D t , D = (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , d 1,n+1 , . . . , d 1,2n , b 1,2n+1 , . . . , b 1,4n ) , the above answer to B has the same distribution as the Problem 2 instance, i.e., the above instance has the same distribution as the one given by generator G P2 β (1 λ , n). Next is a key lemma for applying the proof techniques in [18] to our NIPE (and ZIPE) schemes, where limited randomness is used in public parameter, e.g., {B i,j , B i,j,l } i=1,4;j=1,..,4;l=1,..,n , in the NIPE scheme in Section 6.
Definition 12 (Basic Problem 2) Basic Problem 2 is to guess
β ∈ {0, 1}, given (param n , { B t , B * t } t=0,1 , y * β,0 , f 0 , {y * β,1,i , f 1,i } i=1,..,n ) R ← G BP2 β (1 λG BP2 β (1 λ , n) : (param n , {B t , B * t } t=0,1 ) R ← G NIPE,CT ob (1 λ , 4, n), B 0 := (b 0,1 , b 0,3 , . . . , b 0,5 ), B 1 := (b 1,1 , . . . , b 1,n , b 1,2n+1 , . . . , b 1,4n ), δ, δ 0 , ω U ← F q , ρ,τ U ← F × q , y * 0,0 := (δ, 0, 0, δ 0 , 0) B * 0 , y * 1,0 := (δ, ρ, 0, δ 0 , 0) B * 0 , f 0 := (ω, τ, 0, 0, 0) B 0 , for i = 1, . . . , n; e i := (0 i−1 , 1, 0 n−i ) ∈ F n q , n n n n y * 0,1,i := ( δ e i , 0 n , δ 0 e i , 0 n ) B * 1 y * 1,1,i := ( δ e i ,
A.2.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6. Let e n := (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ F n q . For all x ∈ F n q \ span e n and π ∈ F q , let W x,π := {( r, w) ∈ (span x, e n \ span e n ) × (F n q \ span e n ⊥ ) | r · w = π}. When β = 0, ciphertext ct x generated in step 5 is
